

EXHIBIT No. 40

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone extension number: Op-62 Ext. 1862	Address	Message precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations Released by 160054H Date November 26, 1941	For action CINCPAC	Priority Routine X Deferred
TO: 160054H Decoded by Transmitted by	Information	Priority Routine Deferred

Include by airtel address for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

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Under airtel address the message will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable X. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art 76 (4), Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 41

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 7 May 1941.

Via Clipper Mail—Confidential

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Local Defense Measures of Urgency.

1. A careful study indicates that the only way that submarines can be kept out of an area or destroyed is by the use of:

(a) Small, fast sea-going vessels equipped with listening gear, depth charges and guns.

(b) Aircraft.

(c) A combination of (a) and (b).

(d) Mines.

2. In any Pacific war, it appears very obvious that the principal effort of our enemy will be to concentrate its submarine activity in the area outside and near Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, the island bases and the other ports of the islands. The protection supplied by existing arrangements for this area, exclusive of the Fleet, is very weak and unsatisfactory.

3. At the present time, the District Commandant has four old destroyers only, and these vessels, in addition to their anti-submarine activities, also act as escorts and patrols in the coastal frontier; he has no aircraft and complete reliance has to be placed (exclusive of the Fleet) on Army planes. This necessarily requires much indoctrination of pilots and much training to qualify them for the recognition of various types of vessels and other matters pertaining to the sea before they become proficient in spotting and attacking submarines.

4. At the island bases, harbors with some degree of security will be at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, but it is thought that craft as indicated in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 of this letter will be required at these places.

5. This is particularly true at Wake where it will be a couple of years before the harbor is dredged out. The quickest time ever made in unloading a ship

at Wake is 10 days. Imagine a vessel moored 10 days off Wake Island to transfer freight and provisions to the men working there and to the garrison. This would appear to be the undersigned as being a submarine picnic. Accordingly, it is believed that at that place it will be necessary to have several of the craft indicated in paragraph 1(a).

6. Summarizing, the object of this letter is to invite attention to the weakness of the local defense forces in protecting the vital communication lines at Oahu and the island bases and to recommend that every effort be made to supply this district at the earliest possible time with the necessary implements to combat the most probable form of attack.

C. C. BLOCH.

Copy to: Cinpac

(At this point in Exhibit No. 41 there appears a routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 04122 and date of 7 May 1941. This routing slip will be found reproduced as Item No. 10, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

EXHIBIT No. 42

Cincus W's No. A16/(038W)

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 20 May 1941.

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Fourteenth Naval District—Local defense forces.

References:

- (a) Comdt. 14 ND conf. ltr. A16-1(WP)(4)/ND14(0450) of May 7, 1941.
- (b) Comdt. 14 ND secret ltr. A16-3/A4-3(1)/ND14(177) of May 13, 1941.
- (c) Comdt. 14 ND secret ltr. A16-1/AT-2(5)/ND14(510) of Oct. 31, 1940.
- (d) Comdt. 14 ND conf. ltr. A16-1/AT-2/NP14(829) of December 30, 1940.
- (e) CinCus conf. 1st and. A16 (822) of January 7, 1941.
- (f) CinCus secret ltr. A16 (6129) of January 25, 1941.
- (g) CinCus rest. ltr. A4-3/OP (499) of February 17, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Table of assignment of forces to the Fourteenth Naval District.

1. In reference (a), the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has again invited attention to the serious weakness of the local defense forces of his district, particularly in antisubmarine types. This continues to be a matter of grave concern to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. In case of war it seems certain that the Commander-in-Chief must divert important units of the Fleet from their proper function with the Fleet to supplement the inadequate local defense forces now available, or must accept the risk of serious losses to combatant ships, naval auxiliaries, and merchant ships. If the Fleet should be shifted from the Pearl Harbor area, or be temporarily absent, the local defense forces would be lamentably weak for carrying out their assigned tasks.

2. This situation has been the subject of considerable correspondence during the past year. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in order to lend further emphasis to its critical nature, and to clarify the picture, will briefly review that correspondence:

(a) In reference (b), the Commandant recommended the assignment of 36 vessels, including DD's, PG's, XPG's, PC's, and XPC's, for escort and antisubmarine duty; as well as other vessels for harbor patrol, inshore patrol, mine-sweeping, etc. The Commander-in-Chief concurred in these recommendations.

(b) In reference (c), the Commandant, in response to the Chief of Naval Operations' request of September 23 for his estimate of requirements of certain patrol types, replied with a list by classes, numbers, and contemplated general employment.